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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Section 704(a) of Title VII forbids an employer
from retaliating against an employee because he or
she engaged in certain protected activity. The ques-
tions presented are:
(1) Does section 704(a) forbid an employer
from retaliating for such activity by inflicting
reprisals on a third party, such as a spouse,
family member or fiance, who is closely asso-
ciated with the employee who engaged in
such protected activity?
(2) If so, may that prohibition be enforced
in a civil action brought by the third party
victim?
ii
PARTIES
The parties to this proceeding are set forth in the
caption.
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OPINIONS BELOW
The June 5, 2009 en banc opinion of the Court of
Appeals, which is reported at 567 F.3d 804 (6th
Cir.2009) (en banc), is set out at pp. la-63a of the
Petition Appendix. The March 31, 2008 panel opinion
of the Court of Appeals, which is reported at 520 F.3d
644 (6th Cir.2008), is set out at pp. 64a-90a of the
Petition Appendix. The December 18, 2006 order and
opinion of the District Court for the Eastern District
of Kentucky, which is not reported, is set out at pp.
91a-94a of the Petition Appendix. The June 20, 2006
opinion and order of the District Court, which is
reported at 435 F.Supp.2d 633 (E.D.Ky.2006), is set
out at pp. 95a-109a of the Petition Appendix.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The decision of the Court of Appeals was entered
on June 5, 2009. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). This court granted certiorari
on June 29, 2010.
STATUTES INVOLVED
Section 704(a) of Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), provides in perti-
nent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice
for an employer to discriminate against any
2of his employees ... because he has opposed
any practice, made an unlawful employment
practice under this title, or because he has
made a charge, testified, assisted, or partici-
pated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under this title.
Section 706(b) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(b), provides in pertinent part:
Whenever a charge is filed by or on behalf of
a person claiming to be aggrieved ... alleging
that an employer ... has engaged in an un-
lawful employment practice, the Commission
shall ... make an investigation thereof.
Section 706(f)(1) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-
5(f)(1), provides in pertinent part:
If a charge filed with the Commission pursu-
ant to section (b) is dismissed by the Com-
mission, or if within one hundred and eighty
days from the filing of such charge ... the
Commission has not filed a civil action under
this section ... , the Commission ... shall so
notify the person aggrieved and within nine-
ty days after the giving of such notice a civil
action may be brought against the respond-
ent named in the charge (A) by the person
claiming to be aggrieved or (B) if such charge
was filed by a member of the Commission, by
any person whom the charge alleges was ag-
grieved by the alleged unlawful employment
practice.
3STATEMENT OF THE CASE
At the time when this action arose, Eric Thomp-
son was an employee of North American Stainless,
LP, as was Miriam Regalado. Thompson and
Regalado were engaged to be married,1 and "their
relationship was common knowledge at North Ameri-
can Stainless." (Pet. App. 66a). In September 2002
Regalado filed a charge with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, asserting that her supervi-
sors had discriminated against her based on her
gender. Regalado alleged that she had twice been
demoted because of her gender, and that for the same
unlawful reason she was paid less than a male em-
ployee.2
On February 13, 2003, the EEOC notified North
American Stainless of Regalado’s charge. On Febru-
ary 27, 2003, Thompson’s supervisors were directed to
prepare a memorandum indicating that Thompson
was to be dismissed.3 On March 7, 2003, barely three
weeks after receiving the notice of Regalado’s charge,
North American Stainless dismissed Thompson.
Thompson alleges that he was fired in retaliation for
his then-fianc~e’s (now wife’s) EEOC charge. (Pet.
App. 3a-4a).
1 Thompson and Regalado were subsequently married.
2 Notice of Charge of Discrimination, JA 16-18.
3 Doc. 15-6, at 5-7, 21-22. Thompson had received a perfor-
mance-based wage increase only three months earlier. Doc. 15-
11, at 7.
4Thompson himself filed a timely charge with the
EEOC,4 which conducted an investigation and found
"reasonable cause to believe that [the defendant]
violated Title VII." (Pet. App. 4a).5 After conciliation
efforts were unsuccessful, the EEOC issued a right-
to-sue letter and Thompson brought this action
against North American Stainless. Thompson’s com-
plaint alleged that the employer had dismissed him
in retaliation for his then-fianc~e’s EEOC charge.~
Retaliating in that way, Thompson asserted, violated
section 704(a) of Title VII, which forbids an employer
to "discriminate against any of his employees ...
because he has ... made a charge ... under this title."
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
North American Stainless moved for summary
judgment, contending that as a matter of law
4 Charge of Discrimination, Doc. 20-4 ("I believe I was
discharged because my fiancee filed a charge of discrimination
against the company").
The EEOC "Initial Investigation Information Sheet" filled
out by Thompson asserted that he had been fired because his
"employer knew of status of relationship [with Regalado] and
future marriage. By firing, the others would be intimidated from
doing the same (EEOC claim)." Doc. 15-9 at 6.
5 Determination, Doc. 15-4, at I ("Evidence obtained during
the investigation supports Charging Party’s allegations that the
Respondent retaliated against him by discharging him because
his fiance had filed a charge of discrimination.").
6 JA 12, ~] 9 ("When the Defendant received notice that
Miriam Regal[a]do had filed an EEOC charge against it based
on gender discrimination, the Defendant retaliated against
Plaintiff by terminating him....").
5reprisals against a third party would not "support a
Title VII cause of action.’’7 The District Court granted
the motion and dismissed Thompson’s complaint,
holding that Title VII "does not permit third party
retaliation claims." (Pet. App. 108a).8
A divided panel of the Sixth Circuit initially
overturned the dismissal of the complaint. (Pet. App.
64a-90a). The court of appeals granted North Ameri-
can Stainless’ petition for rehearing en banc. A splin-
tered en banc court upheld the dismissal of
Thompson’s complaint. In addition to the majority
opinion, there was a separate concurring opinion and
three dissenting opinions.
The problem of reprisals against third parties is
not limited to Title VII. Virtually all major federal
statutes governing the employment relationship
prohibit employers from retaliating against employ-
ees for engaging in certain specified protected activi-
ty. The question of whether third party reprisals
are forbidden and redressable has arisen under a
wide variety of those statutes: the National Labor
Relations Act,9 the Americans With Disabilities
7 North American Stainless’s Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc. 12, 5.
8The District Court subsequently denied a motion to
reconsider its decision in light of this Court’s decision in Bur-
lington Northern & Santa Fe Rwy. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53
(2006). (Pet. App. 91a-94a).
9 See pp. 18-19, 23, infra.
6Act,1° the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,11
the Occupational Safety and Health Act,1~ the Family
and Medical Leave Act,13 the Rehabilitation Act,14
ERISA,15 the Equal Pay Act,~6 the Whistleblower
Protection Act,17 the Federal Mine Safety and Health
Act,TM Title IX,~9 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.50
This Court granted review to address these
recurring issues.
lo Fogelman v. Mercy Hospital, Inc., 283 F.3d 561 (3d
Cir.2002).
12 Reich v. Cambridgeport Air Systems, Inc., 26 F.3d 1187
(lst Cir.1994).
13 Elsensohn v. Parish of St. Tammany, 2007 WL 1799684
(E.D.La.2007).
14 Mutts v. Southern Connecticut State University, 2006 WL
1806179 (D.Conn.2006).
15 Fitzgerald v. Codex Corp., 882 F.2d 586 (lst Cir.1989).
16 Marshall v. Georgia Southwestern College, 489 F.Supp.
1322, 1331 (M.D.Ga.1980).
1~ Duda v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 51 M.S.P.R. 444,
447 (1991).
1~ Secretary of Labor v. Leeco, Inc., 24 FMSHRC 589, 591,
2002 WL 31412752 at *3 (F.M.S.H.R.C.).
~ Dawn L. v. Greater Johnstown School Dist., 586
F.Supp.2d 332, 380 (W.D.Pa.2008).
~ Allen-Sherrod v. Henry County School Dist., 2007 WL
1020843 at *3 (N.D.Ga.2007).
7SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. Section 704(a) forbids an employer "to dis-
criminate against any of his employees because he ...
has made a charge ... under this title." Third party
reprisals fall within the language of that prohibition;
those reprisals are a method of retaliating against the
person who engaged in protected activity. The em-
ployer in this case clearly "discriminate[d]" against
Regalado for having filed a Title VII charge when it
selected Regalado (and her fianc~ Thompson) for
adverse action, and did so "because" Regalado had
filed "a charge" with the EEOC.
The prohibitions of section 704(a) are not limited
to any particular type of retaliatory act. Congress
undoubtedly anticipated that third party reprisals
could be among the forms of retaliation to which
employers might resort. "To retaliate against a man
by hurting a member of his family is an ancient
method of revenge, and is not unknown in the field of
labor relations." NLRB v. Advertisers Mfg. Co., 823
F.2d 1086, 1087 (7th Cir.1987).
The EEOC has consistently interpreted section
704(a) to forbid third party reprisals. The agency’s
construction of the statute, rooted in an intensely
practical understanding of the obstacle which retalia-
tion poses to the administration of Title VII, is enti-
tled to significant deference.
The core purpose of section 704(a) is to maintain
"unfettered access to statutory remedial mecha-
nisms." Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346
8(1997). Fear of third party reprisals can easily pre-
vent a worker from complaining to or cooperating
with federal officials. The district court below correct-
ly recognized that "retaliating against a spouse or
close associate of an employee will deter the employee
from engaging in protected activity just as much as if
the employee were himself retaliated against." (Pet.
App. 108a).
Interpreting section 704(a) to forbid third party
reprisals is consistent with the holding in Burlington
Northern & Santa Fe Rwy. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53
(2006), that section 704(a) bans retaliation which is
"likely to dissuade employees from complaining or
assisting in complaints about discrimination."
II. Section 706(f)(1) authorizes a plaintiff such
as Thompson, the direct victim of a third party re-
prisal, to maintain an action to redress the injuries
he suffered as a consequence of the violation of
Regalado’s rights.
Section 706(f)(1) provides that "a civil action may
be brought ... by the person claiming to be aggrieved."
In Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S.
205 (1972), this Court held that the phrase "person
aggrieved" in the 1968 Fair Housing Act encompasses
all individuals with Article III standing. Trafficante
expressly relied on the construction which had been
given to the words "person ... aggrieved" in section
706(f)(1). Person aggrieved should be accorded the
same interpretation in both statutes.
Independent of this language in section 706(f)(1),
in the instant case Thompson meets the requirements
for third party standing. Thompson has clearly suf-
fered a concrete injury in fact as a result of his dis-
missal. Thompson has a "close relationship" with
Regalado (his then fiancee and now wife), the indi-
vidual whose rights were violated. And Regalado
herself would at the least face a serious hindrance if
she brought suit on her own and attempted to obtain
redress for the injuries suffered by Thompson.
The court of appeals acknowledged that Thomp-
son was a person aggrieved under section 706(f)(1).
The Sixth Circuit clearly erred in holding nonetheless
that Thompson does not have a cause of action under
Title VII. Section 706(f)(1) addresses precisely this
issue, expressly stating that "a civil action may be
brought" by a person aggrieved. Section 704(a) does
not limit the cause of action provided by section
706(f)(1); section 704(a) addresses only what conduct
is unlawful, not who can file suit to redress injuries
caused by a violation.
Title
ARGUMENT
THIRD PARTY REPRISALS VIOLATE
SECTION 704(a) OF TITLE VII
A. The Terms of Section 704(a) Prohibit
Third Party Reprisals
Third party reprisals fall squarely within the
VII prohibition against retaliation. Section
10
704(a) forbids an employer "to discriminate against
any of his employees because he ... has made a charge
... under this title." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). The touch-
stone of the prohibition in section 704(a) of Title VII
is the intent of the employer in taking the allegedly
retaliatory action. That provision forbids an employer
to retaliate "because" an individual "has made a
charge." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a). That is precisely the
motive alleged by Thompson: "I was discharged
because my fiancee filed a charge of discrimination
against the company.’’21 The employer in this case
clearly "discriminate[d]" against Regalado for having
filed a Title VII charge when it selected Regalado
(and her fiance) for that adverse action, and did so
because Regalado had "made a charge" under Title
VII.
Petitioner claims that North American Stainless
dismissed him as the method of retaliating against
Regalado.2~ Such third party reprisals violate the
section 704(a) rights of the individual - here Ms.
Regalado - who filed a charge or engaged in protected
activity; dismissing Thompson was "the very means
by which" the employer retaliated against Regalado.
21 Charge of Discrimination, Doc. 20-4.
= See Pet. App. 57a (White, J., dissenting) (employer was
"discriminating against the opposing employee through the
vehicle of firing that employee’s co-employee [fiancb].’); Pet. App.
43a (Moore, J., dissenting) (employer allegedly was "retaliating
through Thompson against Thompson’s then fianc6e/now wife
Miriam Regalado’).
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Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465,
479 (1982).
The protections of section 704(a) are not limited
to any particular form or type of retaliation. Section
704(a) does not contain an exclusive list of the types
of retaliatory practices forbidden by Title VII; indeed,
section 704(a) does not mention any specific methods
of retaliation at all. Rather than attempt to fashion a
list of specified forbidden retaliatory actions, thus
protecting workers only from the listed (but not all)
retaliatory tactics, Congress in section 704(a) broadly
forbade any "discriminat[ion]" because an employee
had engaged in protected activity. The sweeping scope
of that prohibition differs from a number of other
federal anti-retaliation statutes, which by their terms
do apply only to certain specified types of retaliatory
tactics.23 By instead framing section 704(a) without
~ E.g., 10 U.S.C. § 950t(24) (authorizing trial by military
tribunal of a covered individual "who intentionally kills or
inflicts great bodily harm on one or more protected persons ... to
retaliate against government conduct"); 10 U.S.C. § 1034(b) ("No
person may take (or threaten to take) an unfavorable personnel
action, or withhold (or threaten to withhold) a favorable person-
nel action, as a reprisal against a member of the armed forces
for [engaging in certain protected activity]"); 18 U.S.C. § l15(a)
(forbidding assault, murder, or certain other specified crimes of
violence "to retaliate against [a federal] official, judge, or law
enforcement officer on account of the performance of official
duties"); 18 U.S.C. § 1513(a)(1) (forbidding killing or attempting
to kill any person to retaliate for appearing as a witness or party
or providing information to federal law enforcement officials); 18
U.S.C. § 1513(b) (forbidding conduct that "causes bodily injury to
another person or damages the tangible property of another
person" in order to retaliate for appearing as a witness or party
(Continued on following page)
12
any such limitations, Congress made clear its intent
to forbid "the many forms that effective retaliation
can take." Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Rwy. Co.
v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 64 (2006).
The breadth of section 704(a) reflects the gravity
of the times in which it was enacted.24 In the period
or providing information to federal law enforcement officials); 18
U.S.C. § 1521 (forbidding the "fil[ing] ... of ... any false lien or
encumbrance against the real or personal property [of certain
officials] on account of the performance of official duties by that
individual"); 26 U.S.C. § 7804(b)(6) (requiring dismissal of an
employee of the Internal Revenue Service for ’~¢iolations of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, Department of Treasury regula-
tions, or policies of the Internal Revenue Service ... for the
purpose of retaliating against ... a taxpayer"); see 116 Stat. 3242,
sec. 102(1) ("Federal agencies should not retaliate for court
judgments or settlements relating to discrimination and whis-
tleblower laws by targeting the claimant or other employee with
reductions in compensation, benefits, or workforce to pay for
such judgments or settlements").
For example, federal law prohibits only certain specified
types of retaliation against federal law enforcement officials; an
embittered convicted felon is forbidden to assault or kidnap a
law enforcement official, but could lawfully refuse to hire that
official after the official retired. See 18 U.S.C. § 115.
2, In 1949, at the behest of Thurgood Marshall, the Rever-
end J.A. DeLaine enlisted twenty parents in Clarendon County,
South Carolina, to file suit challenging the separate and une-
qual public schools for black children.
Before it was over, they fired him from the little
schoolhouse at which he taught devotedly for ten
years. And they fired his wife and two of his sisters
and a niece. And they threatened him with bodily
harm. And they sued him on trumped-up charges and
convicted him in a kangaroo court and left him with a
judgment that denied him credit from any bank. And
(Continued on following page)
13
leading up to the adoption of Title VII, hostility
towards civil rights workers and racial integration
had reached dangerous levels throughout much of the
South. Homes and churches had been bombed. Civil
rights workers had been murdered. Crosses had been
set aflame to create an atmosphere of intimidation.
Two Presidents had been required to call up the
National Guard to protect African-American students
who wanted to attend previously all-white schools. Fear
of reprisals was deterring many African-Americans
from attempting to exercise their legal and constitu-
tional rights. In that dangerous environment, Congress
understandably framed section 704(a) in sweeping
language intended to eliminate root and branch the
use of threats and retaliation to obstruct implementa-
tion of the promise of equal employment opportunity
in the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The terms of the anti-retaliation provision of
section 704(a) are deliberately broader than the
they burned his house to the ground while the fire de-
partment stood around watching the flames consume
the night. And they stoned the church at which he
pastored. And fired shotguns at him out of the dark ....
Soon after, they burned his church to the ground ....
All of this happened because he was black and
brave. And because others followed when he had de-
cided the time had come to lead.
R. Kluger, Simple Justice, at 3 (1975).
The lawsuit which Reverend DeLaine helped to organize,
Briggs v. Elliott, was consolidated on appeal with similar actions
from Virginia, Delaware and Kansas and was decided by this Court
sub nom. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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language of the anti-discrimination provision of
section 703(a). The reprisals forbidden by section
704(a) are not limited to actions affecting the em-
ployment of the particular individual who engaged in
the protected activity. Burlington Northern & Santa
Fe Rwy. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 66-67 (2006).
Section 703(a), on the other hand, imposes just such a
restriction on discrimination claims. In a discrimina-
tion claim under section 703(a) a plaintiff must show
not only that the action complained of was motivated
by the plaintiff’s race, color, religion, sex or national
origin, but also that that discrimination adversely
affected the plaintiff’s own employment.
It shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discrimination
against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileg-
es of employment, because of such individu-
al’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his em-
ployees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities
or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
15
employee, because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (emphasis added). The empha-
sized words in section 703(a) limit the scope of that
provision to cases in which the plaintiff’s protected
status is the basis for an adverse action related to his
own employment status. No similar restriction is
found in the terms of section 704(a). This linguistic
difference indicates that Congress intended its differ-
ent words to make a legal difference.
We normally presume that, where words dif-
fer as they differ here, "’Congress acts inten-
tionally and purposely in the disparate
inclusion or exclusion.’" Russello v. United
States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983).
Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 63.
Retaliation is "against" a worker who engaged in
protected activity even where the employer’s action
achieves its unlawful purpose by affecting another
worker or individual. See NLRB v. Advertisers Mfg.
Co., 823 F.2d 1086, 1088-89 (7th Cir.1987) (dismissal
of mother of male shop steward was "[a]n effective
method of getting at him, a protected worker"; "[i]f he
loves his mother, this had to hurt him as well"). The
law has long recognized that injury to one individual
can cause emotional distress for a family member or
other associated individual, and that such consequent
16
injury may at times be the very purpose of an inten-
tional tort. State tort law has in varying circumstances
provided redress in such circumstances for that
emotional distress. D. Dobbs, The Law of Torts, 833-37
(2000); see Doc. 15-8, at 23 (Dep. of Eric Thompson)
("It’s been a huge emotional tribulation for both of
US").
It is of no consequence that the employer in this
case allegedly retaliated against Regalado indirectly,
by firing Thompson, rather than directly, by firing
Regalado herself. Either type of reprisal would "dis-
criminate against" Regalado. "Section 704(a)[’s] ...
broad based protection should not be undermined by
allowing the [employer] to accomplish indirectly what
it cannot accomplish directly." (EEOC Decision No.
77-343, 1977 WL 5345, at *1). Surely section 704(a)
would be violated if an employer applied a policy of
kidnapping the children of any worker who filed a
charge with the EEOC. If indirect retaliatory meth-
ods were permitted by section 704(a), there would be
any number of ways in which an ingenious employer
could lawfully punish and deter protected activity.
For example, at a plant with a seniority system, an
employer could eliminate the job of one worker know-
ing that he or she in turn would use seniority to
displace some other employee whom the employer
wished to harm.
Congress undoubtedly anticipated that third
party reprisals would be among the forms of retalia-
tion to which employers might resort. "To retaliate
17
against a man by hurting a member of his family is
an ancient method of revenge, and is not unknown in
the field of labor relations." NLRB v. Advertisers Mfg.
Co., 823 F.2d 1086, 1087 (7th Cir.1987). Such repris-
als against an individual’s family or close associates
have a long and deplorable history as a method of
punishing enemies, deterring conduct, and coercing
disclosure of information, and remain all too common
in events both at home and abroad.25
Congressional awareness of this type of retalia-
tion is reflected in legislation forbidding crimes of
2~ H.R.Rep. 111-166 at 173 (recommending approval of
special immigration visas for Iraqi citizens who assisted coali-
tion forces "at great risk to themselves or their families");
H.R.Rep. 106-487(I) at 21 (traffickers met women at airport and
’%hreatened to kill their families if the women refused to dance
nude in a nightclub"); H.R.Rep. 105-508 at 36 ("prudence
dictates that if former or current CIA personnel are threatened
with harm, the protection provided to them should, in appropri-
ate circumstances, be extended to their immediate families as
well"); H.R.Rep. 105-258 at *2 ("Police and prosecutors report an
increased incidence of threats of physical violence against
victims, witnesses, and their families .... In many cities there are
as many requests for protection of threatened family members
as there are for protection of witnesses themselves."); H.R.Rep.
90-658 at *4 ("Experience has evidenced that potential witnesses
or their families are often intimidated, threatened, or even
gravely injured during the investigative preliminaries to a
criminal prosecution"). See Wilson v. Libby, 535 F.3d 697
(D.C.Cir.2008).
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violence against federal officials; those prohibitions
also apply to crimes against the families of those
officials. Section 115 of the criminal code, for exam-
ple, makes it a federal offense to murder or assault
the immediate family of a United States offi-
cial ... with intent to impede, intimidate, or
interfere with such official ... on account of
the performance of official duties ....
18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1).26 Congress enacted the Taft
Hartley Act in part because it found that if a union
26 Similar]y, section 115(a)(2) declares it a crime to murder
or assault the immediate family of a person who formerly served
as a United States official "with intent to retaliate against such
person on account of the performance of official duties during
the term of service of such person." 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2).
Section 119 forbids the public release of restricted
personal information about [jurors, witnesses, and
certain government officials], or a member of the im-
mediate family of that covered person, ... with the in-
tent and knowledge that the restricted personal
information will be used to threaten, intimate, or fa-
cilitate the commission of a crime of violence against
... a member of the immediate family of that covered
person.
18 U.S.C. § 119(a).
The prohibition against retaliatory killings in section 1513
is even broader; it applies without limitation to the murder of
another person with intent to retaliate against any
person for ... the attendance of a witness or party
at an official proceeding ... or ... providing to a law
enforcement officer any information relating to the
commission ... of a Federal offense ....
18 U.S.C. § 1513(a)(1).
(Continued on following page)
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member opposed corrupt union officials he faced
reprisals, including having "his family threatened."
105 Cong. Rec. 6472 (1959); 2 NLRB, Legislative
History of the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959, p. 1098 (1959). See Gray v.
Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 155 (1996) (armed kidnap-
per threatened to harm family of store manager if he
did not cooperate with robbery); Herrera v. Collins,
506 U.S. 390, 398 n.4 (1993) (potential witness
assertedly silenced by threats of harm to his family).
Since at least 1962 the National Labor Relations
Board has interpreted the National Labor Relations
Act to forbid reprisals against third parties because of
protected activities by union members, officials or
supporters.
A restraint on the exercise of employee rights
is readily apparent where ... the supervisor is
discharged because she is the wife of an em-
ployee who has engaged in union or other
protected activities .... Under these circum-
stances, the rank-and-file employees ... can
Section 1951 defines "robbery" to include the unlawful
taking or obtaining of personal property from the per-
son ... against his will, by means of fear of injury, im-
mediate or future, to ... the person or property of a
relative or member of his family or of anyone in his
company at the time of the taking or obtaining.
18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1).
2O
"reasonably ... fear that the employer would
take similar action against them if they con-
tinued to support the Union." Jackson Tile
Manufacturing Co. [122 NLRB 764 (1958)].
Golub Bros. Concessions, 140 NLRB 120, 127 (1962).27
This Court has repeatedly relied on the established
interpretation of the NLRA in construing Title VII.
See Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 66 ("It]he
National Labor Relations Act, to which this Court has
’drawn analogies ... in other title VII contexts.’ Hishon
v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 76, n.8 (1984)").28
~7 In United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Imple-
ment Workers of America v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Bd., 351 U.S. 266 (1956), the union had "threatened [workers]
and their families with physical injury" if they worked during
strike. 351 U.S. at 269. This Court noted that "the alleged
conduct of the union in coercing employees in the exercise of
their rights is a violation of section 8(b)(1) of th[e NLRA.]" 351
U.S. at 270.
~8 In concluding that section 704(a) forbids third party
reprisals, the EEOC itself has correctly relied on the NLRB’s
interpretation of the NLRA. EEOC Decision No. 77-343, 1977
WL 5345 at "1 ("The National Labor Relations Board in similar
circumstances has frequently held that discrimination against
an employee because he or she has a familial relationship with a
union activist violates the National Labor Relations Act. Illinois
Bell Telephone Company, 228 NLRB 114 (1977); Hickman
Garment Company, 216 NLRB 801 (1975); Forest City Contain-
ers, Inc., 212 NLRB 38 (1974). Accordingly, we conclude that
discrimination against an employee because he or she has a
familial relationship with a person who has filed a charge of
discrimination is violative of Section 704(a) of Title VII.").
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B. The EEOC’s Interpretation of Section
704(a) Is Entitled To Deference
The EEOC has long and consistently interpreted
section 704(a) to forbid an employer to retaliate
against a worker who engaged in protected activity by
inflicting reprisals on a relative or other associated
individual.
The Commission has applied this interpretation
in a series of administrative determinations and
adjudications dating from 1977.29
Certainly, where it can be shown that an
employer discriminated against an individu-
al because he or she was related to a person
who filed a charge, it is clear that the em-
ployer’s intent is to retaliate against the per-
son who filed the charge .... [D]iscrimination
against an employee because he or she has a
familial relationship with a person who has
filed a charge of discrimination is violative of
Section 704(a) of Title VII.
59 EEOC Decision 77-343, 1977 WL 5345 (EEOC); see Ray v.
TVA, 1982 WL 532146 at *3-*4 (EEOC) (applying De Medina v.
Reinhardt, 444 F.Supp. 573 (D.D.C.1979)); Bates v. Widnall, No.
01963655, 1997 WL 332902 (EEOC June 10, 1997) ("lilt is long
settled that third party reprisals are cognizable under EEOC
law"); Alexander v. Peters, No. 05980788, 2000 WL 1218139
(EEOC).
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(EEOC Decision No. 77-343, 1977 WL 5345 at "1).
Since 198430 the Commission’s Compliance Manual
has stated that third party reprisals violate section
704(a). The current version of the compliance manual
states:
The retaliation provisions of Title VII, the
ADEA, the EPA and the ADA prohibit retali-
ation against someone so closely related to or
associated with the person exercising his or
her statutory rights that it would discourage
ed:
Section 614.4(b) of the 1984 Compliance Manual provid-
[T]he retaliation provisions of Title VII prohibit retal-
iation against someone so closely related to the person
exercising his/her Title VII rights that it would dis-
courage or prevent the person from exercising those
rights .... For example, where the son or daughter of
an employee protests unlawful employment practices,
the respondent may try to retaliate against the em-
ployee.
Section 614.3 of the 1988 Compliance Manual provided:
When investigating a retaliation violation it must
first be determined whether a covered respondent has
discriminated against an individual because ... some-
one closely related to that individual has opposed
what (s)he reasonably believes to be Title VII or
ADEA discrimination or has participated in the Title
VII or ADEA process .... [A]s to both opposition and
participation, the retaliation provisions of Title VII
and the ADEA ... prohibit retaliation against someone
so closely related to the person exercising his/her
statutory rights that it would discourage or prevent
the person from exercising those rights.
23
or prevent the person from pursuing those
rights. For example, it would be unlawful for
a respondent to retaliate against an employ-
ee because his or her spouse, who is also an
employee, filed an EEOC charge.
2 EEOC Compliance Manual § 8.II(B)(3)(c) (1998).
The Commission has repeatedly advanced that same
interpretation of section 704(a) by filing suit on behalf
of the victims of third party reprisals31 and by submit-
ting amicus briefs in support of private lawsuits
raising such claims.32
The Commission’s longstanding construction of
section 704(a) is of substantial importance. This
Court has repeatedly recognized that the Commis-
sion’s interpretation of Title VII "reflect[s] a body of
experience and informed judgment to which courts
and litigants may properly resort for guidance"
Federal Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 399
31 EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 576 F.Supp.2d 1240
(D.N.Mex.2008) (retaliation against children because of protect-
ed activity of mother); EEOC v. Nalbandian Sales, Inc., 36
F.Supp.2d 1206 (E.D.Cal.1998) (retaliation against brother
because of protected activity of sister); EEOC v. V & J Foods,
Inc., 2006 WL 3203713 (E.D.Wis.2006) (retaliation against
daughter because of protected activity of mother).
3~ Brief of the EEOC as Amicus in Support of Thompson and
for Reversal, Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, (No.
07-5040) (6th Cir.), available at 2007 WL 2477626; Brief of the
EEOC as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Appellant, Fogelman
v. Mercy Hosp., (No. 00-2263) (3d Cir.), available at 2001 WL
34119171.
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(2008).33 Because, as this Court noted in Burlington
Northern, the proper application of section 704(a)
turns in part on an evaluation of the deterrent conse-
quences of particular forms of retaliation, the Com-
mission’s assessment of this intensely practical issue,
reflecting the Commission’s extensive experience with
the fears and concerns of countless Charging Parties
over several decades, is entitled to especial weight.
See Robinson, 519 U.S. at 345-46 (noting position of
EEOC that excluding former employees from the
protections of section 704(a) "would undermine the
effectiveness of Title VII").
The EEOC is not alone in construing federal
anti-retaliation statutes in this manner. The NLRB
has applied this interpretation of the NLRA in cases
in which the injured third party was a non-
supervisory employee, a supervisory employee, and
an independent contractor.34 The Department of
33 See Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville
and Davidson County, 129 S.Ct. 846, 851 (2009); Bragdon v.
Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 642 (1998); Clackamas Gastroenterology
Associates, P.C.v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 449 n.9 (2003); Local No.
93, International Association of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland,
478 U.S. 501, 518 (1986); Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
~4 Advertisers Mfg. Co., 280 NLRB 1185, 1186 (1986)
(retaliation against mother because of protected activities of
son); International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 400, 265
NLRB 1316, 1320 (1982) (retaliation against wife for protected
activities of husband; independent contractor); Hickman Gar-
ment Co., 216 NLRB 801 (1975) (retaliation against daughter-in-
law because of protected activities of mother-in-law); American
(Continued on following page)
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Labor has repeatedly construed in the same manner
the federal employment laws which it enforces. In
Reich v. Cambridgeport Air Systems, Inc., the De-
partment of Labor advanced a similar construction of
the anti-retaliation provision of the Occupational
Health and Safety Act. The Department relied on
precedents regarding section 704(a) and the NLRA in
arguing that the anti-retaliation provision of OSHA
forbids third party reprisals.3~ The Department
interprets the anti-retaliation provision of the Feder-
al Mine Safety and Health Act in the same way, there
too relying on cases holding that third party reprisals
violate the NLRA and Title VII.36 In Marshall v.
Georgia Southwestern College, 489 F.Supp. 1322
(M.D.Ga.1980), the Department argued that the anti-
retaliation provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act,
which applies to the Equal Pay Act, forbids an em-
ployer to force a male employee to resign his position
because his wife had filed a complaint about discrim-
ination in compensation.
Buslines, Inc., 211 NLRB 947, 948 (1974) (retaliation against
wife for protected activities of husband); Forest City Containers,
Inc., 212 NLRB 38, 40 (1974) (retaliation against worker
because of protected activity of her fiance’s mother); Ridgely
Mfg. Co., 207 NLRB 83, 88-89 (1973) (retaliation against wives
because of protected activities of husbands).
3~ Brief for the Secretary of Labor, Reich v. Cambridgeport
Air Systems, Inc., (1st Cir.1994) (No. 93-2287) at 18-21, available
at 1994 WL 16506060.
36 Secretary of Labor v. Leeco, Inc., 24 FMSHRC 589, 591,
2002 WL 31412752 at *3 (F.M.S.H.R.C.).
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As this Court noted in Burlington Northern,
"Congress has provided similar kinds of protection
from retaliation in comparable statutes." 548 U.S. at
66 (citing Title VII and the NLRA). Although there
are some textual differences among these statutes,
the government’s construction of these various laws
reflects a consistent concern that permitting third
party reprisals would reduce access to remedial
mechanisms, impair the willingness of employees to
contact or provide information to federal agencies,
and thus undermine enforcement of the underlying
substantive provisions. Interpreting these anti-
retaliation provisions in a similar manner, except
where unambiguous textual differences compel some
distinction, would be consistent with the congression-
al understanding that comparable federal provisions
would be construed alike.
CB Applying Section 704(a) To Third Party
Reprisals Advances The Purposes of
That Provision
Interpreting the terms of section 704(a) to forbid
third party reprisals is important to assuring that the
anti-retaliation provision will be effective in protect-
ing workers who file charges or engage in other
covered activities. In this respect the "purpose [of
section 704(a)] reinforces what language already
indicates." Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 64; see
Robinson, 519 U.S. at 849 (where language of section
704(a) is ambiguous, Court adopts construction that
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is "more consistent with the broader context of Title
VII and the primary purpose of § 704(a)’).
"Title VII depends for its enforcement upon the
cooperation of employees who are willing to file
complaints and act as witnesses." Burlington North-
ern, 548 U.S. at 67. Because most charging parties
(and most witnesses) would be employees of the
employer alleged to have violated Title VII, that
employer usually has the economic power to deter or
punish those who complain to or cooperate with the
Commission.
[T]he anti-retaliation provision’s "primary pur-
pose," [is] "[m]aintaining unfettered access to
statutory remedial mechanisms." Robinson v.
Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997).
"Plainly effective enforcement could thus on-
ly be expected if employees felt free to ap-
proach officials with their grievances."
Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361
U.S. 288, 292 (1960). Interpreting the anti-
retaliation provision to provide broad protec-
tion from retaliation helps assure the coop-
eration upon which accomplishment of the
Act’s primary objective depends.
The anti-retaliation provision seeks to pre-
vent employer interference with "unfettered
access" to Title ViI’s remedial mechanisms.
Robinson [v. Shell Oil Co.,] 519 U.S. [337,]
346 [(1997)].
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Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 64-68; see NLRB v.
Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117, 121-22 (1972) (purpose of the
NLRA anti-retaliation provision is to ensure employ-
ees are "’completely free from coercion against report-
ing’" unlawful practices) (quoting Nash v. Florida
Industrial Comm’n, 389 U.S. 235, 238 (1967)). Pre-
venting all forms of retaliation is particularly im-
portant in light of "documented indications that
’[f]ear of retaliation is the leading reason why people
stay silent instead of voicing their concerns about
bias and discrimination.’" Crawford v. Metropolitan
Government of Nashville and Davidson County, 129
S.Ct. 846, 852 (2009) (quoting Brake, Retaliation, 90
Minn. L. Rev. 18, 20, 37 and n.58 (2005)).
The deterrent effect of third party reprisals is
widely recognized. The district judge in this case,
although concluding that Sixth Circuit precedent
barred any action for third party reprisals, candidly
recognized that "retaliating against a spouse or close
associate of an employee will deter the employee from
engaging in protected activity just as much as if the
employee were himself retaliated against." (Pet. App.
108a).
There can be no doubt that an employer who
retaliates against the friends and relatives of
employees who initiate anti-discrimination
proceedings will deter employees from exer-
cising their protected rights.
[A]ction taken against the third party em-
ployee can have the effect of coercing the
29
employee engaged in protected activity, and
may also coerce other employees of the com-
pany from engaging in protected activity in
the future.
Fogelman v. Mercy Hospital, Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 568-
70 and n.5 (3d Cir.2002); Holt v. JTM Industries,
Inc., 89 F.3d 1224, 1233 (5th Cir.1996) (Dennis, J.,
dissenting) ("the threat of retaliatory action against
a family member or friend is a substantial deterrent
to the free exercise of rights protected under the
ADEA").37 Indeed, as the EEOC has observed,
37 See Rainer v. Refco, Inc., 464 F.Supp. 742, 746 (S.D.Ohio
2006) ("[c]learly, if an employer were free to discharge any
relative of an employee who complained about discrimination
without fear of liability, there would be a chilling effect on the
inclination of employees whose relatives were part of the same
workforce to complain about discrimination"); EEOC v.
Nalbandian Sales, Inc., 36 F.Supp.2d 1206, 1210 (E.D.Cal.1998)
("an interpretation [that permitted third party reprisals] would
chill employees from exercising their Title VII rights against
unlawful employment practices out of fear that their protected
activity could adversely jeopardize the employment status of a
friend or relative"); Clark v. R.J.Reynolds ~bbacco Co., 1982 WL
2277 at *7 (E.D.La.) ("[p]laintiff’s son would certainly be
deterred from exercising his rights under Title VII if there was a
threat that his former employer would fire his father if he were
to file a charge of discrimination against it"); De Medina v.
Reinhardt, 444 F.Supp. 573, 580 (D.D.C.1978) ("tolerance of
third-party reprisals would, no less than tolerance of direct
reprisals, deter persor~s from exercising their protected rights
under Title VII").
3O
threats of reprisals against third parties can be
especially efficacious.3s
In Burlington Northern this Court cited as an
example of "effective[] retaliat[ion] against an em-
ployee ... causing him harm outside the workplace"
the reprisal in Rochon v. Gonzalez, 438 F.3d 1211,
1213 (D.C.Cir.2006), in which the FBI retaliation
against the plaintiff "took the form of the FBI’s re-
fusal ... to investigate death threats a federal prisoner
made against [the Special Agent] and his wife." 548
U.S. at 63-64 (emphasis added and omitted). It is
inconceivable that in a situation such as Rochon
section 704(a) permits a government agency to retali-
ate against a law enforcement officer who filed a
charge with the EEOC by refusing to protect his
family from death threats, so long as the agency
28 Brief of the EEOC as Amicus Curiae In Support of the
Appellant, Fogelman v. Mercy Hosp., (No. 00-2263) (3d Cir.) at
25-26.
IT]he fact that retaliation is against a third party only
enhances the pressure on the employee contemplating
the exercise of protected activity. Where an employee
has already been the target of discrimination, the
threat of economic sanction may be outweighed by the
employee’s personal desire to vindicate her statutory
rights. If the employer, however, could reach into the
workforce to target other employees, the aggrieved
employee may be more reluctant to assert her statuto-
ry rights. In that case, the employee risks not only her
own economic future, which has already been threat-
ened by the employer, but the future of her fellow
workers as well.
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continues to protect the officer himself. In assessing
whether the retaliatory actions against the plaintiff
in Burlington Northern itself were sufficiently serious
to be unlawful, the Court expressly considered the
impact of that retaliation on the family of the worker
involved, as well as on the worker herself.39
The chilling effect of third party reprisals is at
least usually one of the very purposes of that form of
retaliation. If third party reprisals are permissible
under section 704(a), "employers can use Thompson,
and others like him, as swords to keep employees
from invoking their statutory rights with no redress
for the harms suffered by those individuals." (Pet.
App. 43a-44a) (Moore, J., dissenting). In the absence
of an enforceable prohibition against that practice,
employers could deliberately
evade the reach of the [anti-retaliation] stat-
ute by making relatives or friends of com-
plaining parties the "whipping boys" for the
protected conduct of others.
39 Cf. 548 U.S. at 72:
White and her family had to live for 37 days without
income. They did not know during that time whether
or when White could return to work. White described
to the jury the physical and emotional hardship that
37 days of having "no income, no money" in fact
caused .... (" ... No income, no money, and that made
all of us feel bad ... ")
(Emphasis added).
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Holt v. JTM Industries, Inc., 89 F.3d at 1233 (Dennis,
J., dissenting). As the EEOC has warned, if third
party reprisals are not prohibited - or if any such
prohibition is incapable of meaningful enforcement -
an employer could adopt an express policy of inflict-
ing such reprisals.
[A]n employer could openly use the threat of
third-party retaliations to ban the very activ-
ities protected by Section 704(a). An employ-
er could adopt a policy of seeking reprisals in
any case in which an employee protested dis-
crimination, filed a charge with the Commis-
sion, or otherwise participated in the
enforcement process. That policy could re-
quire the termination of any relative, friend,
or co-worker of the individual engaging in
the protected activity.4°
In NLRB v. Advertisers Mfg. Co., 823 F.2d 1086 (7th
Cir.1987), the Seventh Circuit held that reprisals
against supervisory officials violate the NLRA be-
cause "[i]f, as the Board found ... , the company fired
[the mother] because of her son’s union activities,
there could be only one purpose, and that was to
intimidate union supporters.’~1 (Emphasis added).
40 Brief of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
as Appellant, EEOC v. Ohio Edison Co., (No. 92-3173) (6th Cir.),
text at n. 1.
41 In Reich v. Cambridgeport Air Systems, Inc., 26 F.3d 1187
(1st Cir.1994), the First Circuit upheld a retaliation claim under
OSHA regarding the dismissal of a worker who was a "particu-
larly close friend[ ]" of a worker who had complained about
(Continued on following page)
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Unredressed third party reprisals could be a
powerful deterrent to protected activity. In the wake
of the dismissal of petitioner Thompson, and of the
Sixth Circuit decision that followed, any worker of
ordinary prudence at North American Stainless could
be understandably reluctant to file a charge with the
EEOC. Effective redress for the victims of third party
reprisals is thus essential to remove the chilling effect
that such a reprisal would have on other workers.
NLRB v. Advertisers Mfg. Co., 823 F.2d at 1088-89
("[The mother] is ... being reinstated so that ... pro-
tected employees will not be deterred from exercising
their rights ... by fear that if they do the company will
try to get back at them in any way it can, including
firing their relatives."); Kenrich Petrochemicals, Inc.
v. NLRB, 907 F.2d 400, 410 (3d Cir. 1990) (en banc)
("reinstatement [of the dismissed family member]
was ordered to demonstrate to the employees and
supervisors at Kenrich that our labor laws do not
permit employers to intimidate protected employees
by using family members as hostages."). To deny
judicial redress to those third party victims
would encourage employers to take reprisals
against the friends, relatives, and colleagues
of an employee who ha[s] asserted a [dis-
crimination] claim. Through coercion, intim-
idation, threats, or interference with an
health and safety problems. That reprisal, the trial court had
concluded, was inflicted to "’impress the other employees’ not to
associate with health and safety advocates." 26 F.3d at 1189.
34
employee’s co-workers, an employer could
discourage an employee from asserting such
a claim.
Craig v. Suburban Cablevision, Inc., 140 N.J. 623,
630, 660 A.2d 505, 508 (1995).
D. The Standard In Burlington Northern
Controls Which Third Party Reprisals
Are Unlawful
This Court’s decision in Burlington Northern
provides the standard for determining when a third
party reprisal sufficiently implicates the purpose of
section 704(a) to violate the law. A particular retalia-
tory practice is forbidden by section 704(a) if "it well
might have ’dissuaded a reasonable worker from
making or supporting a charge of discrimination.’"
Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 67 (quoting Rochon
v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C.Cir.2006)); see
548 U.S. at 70 (reprisal unlawful if it is "likely to
dissuade employees from complaining or assisting in
complaints about discrimination").
Consistent with the standard in Burlington
Northern, the EEOC has concluded that third party
reprisals are unlawful if the adverse action is taken
"against someone so closely related to or associated
with the person exercising his or her statutory rights
that it would discourage or prevent the person from
pursuing those rights." 2 EEOC Compliance Manual
§ 8.II(B)(3)(c) (1998). The retaliatory act itself must
also be sufficiently serious to satisfy the Burlington
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Northern standard. "[N]ormally petty slights, minor
annoyances, and simple lack of good manners will not
create such deterrence." Burlington Northern, 548
U.S. at 68.
II. SECTION 706(f)(1) AUTHORIZES SUITS
BY THE VICTIMS OF THIRD PARTY RE-
PRISALS
A. Victims of Third Party Reprisals Are
"Persons ... Aggrieved" Within The
Scope of Section 706(f)(1)
The retaliatory action alleged in this case violat-
ed the rights of Regalado, the individual whose action
in filing a charge with the EEOC was protected by
section 704(a). Section 706(f)(1) of Title VII authoriz-
es Thompson, the immediate victim of that retalia-
tion, to maintain this action to redress the injuries
which he suffered as a consequence of the violation of
Regalado’s rights.
Section 706(f)(1) provides that when certain
exhaustion requirements have been satisfied "a civil
action may be brought against the respondent named
in the charge ... by the person claiming to be ag-
grieved." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). The court below
correctly concluded, as have most courts of appeals to
address this issue,4~ that by using the phrase "person
42 Anjelino v. The New York ~mes Co., 200 F.3d 73 (3d
Cir.2000); Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Services, Inc., 222 F.3d
289, 296 (7th Cir.2000); Hornev. Firemen’s Retirement System of
(Continued on following page)
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... aggrieved" in section 706(f)(1) Congress authorized
suit by any plaintiff with Article III standing, thus
lifting the usual prudential rule limiting standing to
individuals whose own rights have been violated.
"[T]he ’person claiming to be aggrieved’ language of
§ 2000e-5 shows a congressional intent to define
standing under Title VII as broadly as is permitted by
Article III of the Constitution." (Pet. App. 10a n. 1).
In Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409
U.S. 205 (1972), this Court held that the phrase
"person aggrieved" in the Fair Housing Act of 1968
encompasses all individuals with Article III stand-
ing.43 The decision in Trafficante expressly relied on a
construction of those same words in section 706 of
Title VII.
Hackett v. McGuire Bros., Inc., 445 F.2d 442
(CA 3), which dealt with the phrase that
allowed a suit to be started "by a person
claiming to be aggrieved" under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a),
St. Louis, 69 F.3d 233, 235 (8th Cir.1995); Fair Employment
Council of Greater Washington, Inc. v. BMC Marketing Corp., 28
F.3d 1268, 1278 (D.C.Cir.1994).
43 History associates the word "aggrieved" with a
congressional intent to cast the standing net broadly -
beyond the commomlaw interests and substantive
statutory rights upon which "prudential" standing
traditionally rested. Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v.
FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (1942); FCC v. Sanders Brothers Ra-
dio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
FEC v. Atkins, 524 U.S. 11, 20 (1998).
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concluded that the words used showed "a
congressional intention to define standing as
broadly as is permitted by Article III of the
constitution." Id. at 446. With respect to
suits brought under the 1968 Act, we reach
the same conclusion ....
409 U.S. at 366-67 (footnote omitted).
Trafficante concluded that this broad reading of
"person aggrieved" in the Fair Housing Act was
supported by the structure of that statute.
The design of the Act confirms this construc-
tion. HUD has no power of enforcement. So
far as federal agencies are concerned only
the Attorney General may sue; yet ... he may
sue only to correct "a pattern or practice" of
housing discrimination. That phrase "a pat-
tern or practice" creates some limiting fac-
tors in his authority.... Since HUD has no
enforcement powers and since the enormity
of the task of assuring fair housing makes
the role of the Attorney General in the mat-
ter minimal, the main generating force must
be private suits .... We can give vitality to [the
provision authorizing suit by a person ag-
grieved] only by a generous construction
which gives standing to sue to all in the
same housing unit who are injured by racial
discrimination in the management of those
facilities ....
Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 210-12. Those same practical
considerations were applicable to Title VII at the
time that statute, including section 706(f)(1), were
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originally enacted. Under the terms of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, the EEOC itself had no authority to
initiate litigation,44 and the Department of Justice
could file suit only to redress "a pattern or practice" of
violations of Title VII.4~ Thus a broad authorization of
private suits was as essential under Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act as it was under the Fair Hous-
ing Act.
In framing civil rights legislation, Congress has
repeatedly authorized lawsuits by "persons ag-
grieved," a legislative choice reflecting the unique
importance and difficulty of enforcing these laws. In
the 1964 Civil Rights Act itself Congress authorized
persons "aggrieved" to enforce the public accommoda-
tions provision in Title II, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a).
Suits by persons "aggrieved" were also authorized by
the 1967 Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1), and the Rehabilitation Act
Amendments of 1973.29 U.S.C. § 794a. Subsequently
both the 1991 Americans With Disabilities Act and
44 In 1972 Congress amended Title VII to authorize the
EEOC to file suit to enforce Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 706(f)(1).
45 The limited authority of the Department of Justice to
bring pattern or practice actions under the Fair Housing Act of
1968 was undoubtedly modeled on the similar provision in
section 707(a) of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6. The first thirty-
seven words of 42 U.S.C. § 3614(a), authorizing pattern or
practice suits by the Attorney General, are taken verbatim from
section 707(a) ("Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable
cause to believe that any person or group of persons is engaged
in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any
of the rights secured by this....").
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the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of
2008 incorporated by reference the remedial provi-
sions (including the "person aggrieved" provision of
section 706(f)(1)) of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000ff-
6(a)(1), 12117(a).
The EEOC construes Title VII to authorize action
by the immediate victim of a third party reprisal, as
well as by the employee whose protected activities
triggered that reprisal. 2 Compliance Manual §§ 8-
I(B) ("[A charging party] can ... challenge retaliation
by a respondent based on ... protected activity by
someone closely related to or associated with the
charging party"), 8-II(B)(3)(c) (1998) ("[r]etaliation
against a close relative can be challenged by both the
individual who engaged in protected activity and the
relative, where both are employees"). The Commis-
sion’s construction of section 704(a) is to weight.
B. Thompson Satisfies The Standards for
Third Party Standing
The Court need not rely on the "person ... ag-
grieved" provision in section 706(f)(1) to conclude
that Thompson may bring this action. Independent of
those words in section 706(f)(1), the circumstances of
this case fall within the well established standard
permitting suit by certain individuals injured by
actions violating the rights of third parties.
A party "generally must assert his own legal
rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to
relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties."
4O
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). This Court
"has not treated this rule as absolute, however,
recognizing that there may be circumstances where it
is necessary to grant a third party standing to assert
the rights of another." Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S.
125, 129-30 (2004). A party seeking third-party stand-
ing must make three showings.
We have recognized the right of litigants to
bring actions on behalf of third parties, pro-
vided three important criteria are satisfied:
The litigant must have suffered an "injury in
fact," thus giving him or her a "sufficiently
concrete interest" in the outcome of the issue
in dispute, ... ; the litigant must have a close
relation to the third party, ... ; and there
must exist some hindrance to the third par-
ty’s ability to protect his or her own inter-
ests.
Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114-15 (1976).46 All
three of those requirements are met here.
First, Thompson indisputably suffered an injury
in fact, having been dismissed from a position as a
metallurgical engineer which he had held for seven
years. Thompson was unemployed for a year after
4~ Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392, 397 (1998); Georgia
v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 55 (1992); Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 614, 619 (1991); Secretary of State of
Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., Inc., 467 U.S. 947, 956
(1984); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410-11 (1991).
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that dismissal.47 Thompson and Regalado were mar-
ried shortly after his termination, and had to live
apart for nearly a year when Thompson was forced to
move to another city to find comparable employ-
ment.48 Thompson testified that the resulting forced
separation from his wife was a "huge hardship for our
marriage."49 The injury to Thompson was not an
incidental and indirect consequence of some economic
harm done to Regalado. Precisely to the contrary, it
was Thompson himself who suffered the immediate
injury caused by the retaliatory dismissal; injuring
Thompson was the means by which the employer
sought to punish Regalado. "[T]he harm [to Thomp-
son] was the intended consequence of the unlawful
practice (albeit an intermediate harm in path to the
ultimate goal of harming Regalado) .... " (Pet. App. 58a
(White, J., dissenting); see Pet. App. 51a ("North
American Stainless harmed Thompson in order to
effectuate this retaliation [against Regalado]")
(Moore, J. dissenting). Thompson clearly has a con-
crete interest in the monetary and injunctive relief
sought in this action.
Second, there undeniably was a "close relation-
ship" between Thompson and his then fiancee
Regalado; by the time this lawsuit was filed, Thomp-
son and Regalado were married.5° The relationship of
47 Doc. 15-8 (Thompson Dep.), at 17.
48 Id. at 14, 23.
49 Id. at23.
~o JA 10, ~ 1.
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husband and wife is certainly closer than the rela-
tionships this Court has previously held sufficient to
satisfy this element. E.g., Campbell v. Louisiana, 523
U.S. 392, 397 (1998) (relationship of criminal defend-
ant to prospective grand jurors); Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 614, 619 (1991)
(relationship of civil litigant to prospective jurors);
Powers v. Ohio, 428 U.S. 400, 410-11 (1991) (relation-
ship between criminal defendant and prospective
jurors); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 90 (1976) (relation-
ship of liquor store to purchasers of alcoholic bever-
ages under the age of twenty-one); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (relationship between
family planning advocate and women to whom he
provided birth control materials). "[T]here can be no
doubt that [Thompson] will be a motivated, effective
advocate for the ... rights [of Regalado]." Powers v.
Ohio, 499 U.S. at 414.~1
This Court has repeatedly recognized standing in
situations such as this in which the defendant’s
action "’against the litigant would result indirectly in
the violation of third parties’ rights.’" Kowalski, 543
U.S. at 131 (emphasis in original) (quoting Warth,
422 U.S. at 510). The denial of relief to victims
of third party reprisals, such as Thompson, "may
’materially impair the ability of’ third persons in
~1 See Singleton, 428 U.S. at 115 (question is whether "the
relationship between the litigant and the third party may be
such that the former is fully, or very nearly, as effective a
proponent of the right as the latter.")
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[Regalado’s] position to exercise their rights." Caplin
& Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617,
623 n.3 (1989) (quoting Baird, 405 U.S. at 445); see
Craig, 429 U.S. at 196; Baird, 405 U.S. at 446.
Third, this is clearly a situation in which "there
exists some hindrance to the third party’s ability to
protect its own interests." Georgia v. McCollum, 505
U.S. at 55; see Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 130 ("whether
there is a ’hindrance’ to the possessor’s ability to
protect his own interests") (quoting Powers, 499 U.S.
at 411). Where such a hindrance exists, "the third
party’s absence from the court loses its tendency to
suggest that his right is not truly at stake, or truly
important to him, and the party who is in court
becomes by default the right’s best available propo-
nent." Singleton, 428 U.S. at 115.
If Regalado herself were to file suit, Article III
would at the least pose a serious obstacle to obtaining
any of the relief needed to redress the injuries caused
by the unlawful third party reprisal against Thomp-
son. Regalado would have considerable difficulty
establishing the requisite Article III standing to seek
an award of backpay or damages payable to Thomp-
son. The core standing requirement imposed by
Article III is that a plaintiff have a personal stake in
the outcome of a particular claim. "To demonstrate
standing, a plaintiff must have ’alleged such a per-
sonal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction.’"
Salazar v. Buono, 130 S.Ct. 1803, 1814 (2010)
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(quoting Hornev. Flores, 557 U.S. __., __, 129 S.Ct.
2479, 2592 (2009) (emphasis in original)). A plaintiff’s
hope that a relative or close friend will receive a
monetary award or a job is not such a "personal
stake." If Mr. Thompson had been injured in an
accident, Ms. Regalado obviously would not have had
the requisite "personal stake" in whether a court
might award damages payable to her fianc~ or hus-
band. A litigant only has standing to seek "remedia-
tion of its own injury," Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better
Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 107 (1998), not remedia-
tion of harms done to others. Standing is determined
by the identity of the party to whom a court orders
that monetary relief be paid. It does not "matter what
the [plaintiff] do[es] with the money afterward."
Sprint Communications Co. v. APCC Services, Inc.,
554 U.S. 269, __, 128 S.Ct. 2531, 2543 (2008). For
similar reasons, Regalado would have serious difficul-
ty establishing Article III standing to seek an injunc-
tion directing that Thompson be reinstated.~-
52 See De Medina v. Reinhardt, 444 F.Supp. 573, 580
(D.D.C.1978) ("while plaintiff’s husband might be in a position
to seek injunctive relief to prohibit future reprisals against
his spouse, he would certainly not be in a position to seek
back pay and/or retroactive promotion based on spouse’s
employment denial"); Smith v. Frye, 488 F.3d 263, 272-73 (4th
Cir.2007) (son who engaged in protected activity lacks Article
III standing to obtain redress for mother injured by third
party reprisal); Pet. App. 43a n.5 (Moore, J., dissenting)
("Regalado’s ability to sue in this matter does not solve the
instant problem because the relief Regalado would be able to
seek would appear to differ substantially from the relief that
(Continued on following page)
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Regalado would presumably have Article III
standing to obtain an injunction against future third
party reprisals, if she could show, for example, that
she had relatives who also worked for North Ameri-
can Stainless. But such prospective relief would do
nothing to redress the harm caused by the past
violation, or to remove the chilling effect of Thomp-
son’s dismissal.
The procedural provisions of Title VII present a
second obstacle to enforcement of the prohibition
against third party reprisals by the individual who
engaged in protected activity. A plaintiff cannot bring
suit under Title VII unless he or she has first filed a
charge with the EEOC. But it would rarely if ever
occur to most couples (or family members) that if one
of them is the victim of a third party reprisal, the
other employee is the person required to complain to
the EEOC. Limiting redress to those rare instances in
which an employee who engaged in protected activity
somehow figured out that she, not the direct victim of
the reprisal, was supposed to file a Title VII charge
would usually be a fatal obstacle "in a statutory
scheme in which laymen, unassisted by trained
lawyers, initiate the process." Love v. Pullman Co.,
440 U.S. 522, 527 (1972).53
Thompson can seek. Specifically, it is unclear whether Regalado
would be able to sue to have Thompson reinstated.").
~3 See Federal Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 402
(2008) ("a remedial scheme in which laypersons, rather than
(Continued on following page)
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C. Section 704(f)(1) Provides a Cause of
Action for "Persons ... Aggrieved"
The court below assumed that section 704(a)
forbids third party reprisals, and acknowledged that
Thompson is a "person aggrieved" under section
706(f)(1). It insisted, however, that Title VII does not
provide Thompson with a "cause of action" to redress
his injuries. (Pet. App. 8a, 9a and n.1, 27a). Whether
a plaintiff has a cause of action under Title VII, the
court of appeals reasoned, turns on whether he or she
"is a member of the class of litigants that may, as a
matter of law, appropriately invoke the power of the
court." (Pet. App. 9a (quoting Davis v. Passman, 442
U.S. 228,239 n.18 (1979)). Thompson, the court below
concluded, lacked "a cause of action under § 704(a)."
(Pet. App. 9a, 9a n.1).
The issue in Davis, however, was whether the
courts should infer the existence of a cause of action
to enforce the Constitution in the absence of any
applicable statutory cause of action.54 Davis explained
that "the question of who may enforce a statutory
right is fundamentally different from the question of
who may enforce a right that is protected by the
lawyers, are expected to initiate the process") (quoting EEOC v.
Commercial Office Products Co., 486 U.S. 107, 124 (1988)).
~4 Section 1983 provides such a statutory cause of action
where state and local officials have violated federal constitu-
tional rights. Davis, however, concerned an alleged constitution-
al violation by federal officials. See Bivens v. Six Unknown
Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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constitution" 442 U.S. at 241 (emphasis in original).
"Statutory rights and obligations are established by
Congress, and it is entirely appropriate for Congress,
in creating these rights and obligations, to determine
in addition, who may enforce them and in what
manner." Id. Davis thus concerns only the standard
the courts would use in deciding who could sue in the
absence of a statutory cause of action.
But the question of which "class of litigants may
... invoke the power of the court" to enforce Title VII
is squarely answered by the unambiguous terms of
section 706(f)(1), which states that "a civil action may
be brought ... by the person claiming to be aggrieved."
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). Section 706(f)(1) creates an
express cause of action55 to obtain judicial redress,
and spells out which individuals are accorded that
cause of action: those persons who are "aggrieved" by
the asserted violation. Once a plaintiff establishes
that he or she is "aggrieved" within the meaning of
section 706(f)(1), the inquiry as to whether he or she
has a cause of action is at an end. There is thus no
need to inquire (as did the court below) whether, in
the absence of the express cause of action under
section 706(a)(1), the courts would infer a "cause of
55 See Smith v. Casellas, 119 F.3d 33, 34 (D.C.Cir.1997) ("the
private right of action provided for in section 706(f)(1)’); Etemad
v. United States, 1993 WL 114831 at *1 (9th Cir.) ("[t]he private
right of action ... under section 706(f)(1)’); Turner v. Texas
Instruments, Inc., 556 F.2d 1349, 1351 (5th Cir.1977) ("section
706(f)(1)’s ... private cause of action").
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action under 704(a)." The courts are not at liberty to
engraft additional requirement onto section 706(f)(1),
or to limit the cause of action provided by that pro-
vision to only some, but not all, "person[s] ... ag-
grieved."
The court of appeals asserted that "[s]ection
704(a) ... limits the class of claimants" who are af-
forded the right to sue for retaliation. (Pet. App. 27a).
That is simply incorrect. Section 704(a) addresses
only what conduct constitutes forbidden retaliation;
section 704(a) does not even purport to address who
can file suit to enforce that prohibition.~6 The "class of
claimants" who are afforded the right to sue - for
retaliation or any other violation of Title VII - is set
out instead in section 706(f)(1), which requires only
that a private plaintiff be "aggrieved." Similarly, the
statutory authorization of suits by EEOC and the
Department of Justice to enforce section 704(a) is
found, not in section 704(a), but in sections 706(f)(1)
and 707(a). If section 704(a) limited the parties
56 See Pet. App. 30a (Rogers, J., concurring) ("[Section
704(a)] dictates what practices amount to unlawful retaliation,
not who may sue .... The question of who may sue is simply not
addressed by [section 704(a)]. Rather, the procedural provisions
of Title VII provide that ’person[s] claiming to be aggrieved’ and
’person[s] aggrieved’ may sue for Title VII violations. [§§ 706(b),
706(f)(1)]’); 56a (White, J., dissenting) ("[T]he plain language of
§ 704(a) is addressed to declaring that particular conduct by an
employer constitutes an unlawful employment practice. Contra-
ry to the majority’s characterization, the statutory language
does not tell us ’who falls under the umbrella of its protection,’...
but rather, what conduct is prohibited.") (emphasis in original).
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authorized to enforce that provision to the persons
who had engaged in protected activity, it would bar
suits by the Department of Justice and by the EEOC.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the decision of the Court
of Appeals should be reversed.
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